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I. INTRODUCTION
For the friend of originalism and economic liberties, the Constitution
is a mixed bag. Certainly, the constitutional text contains some clauses
that expressly protect economic liberties, such as the Contract Clause
and the Takings Clause. But the constitutional text does not comprehensively
protect economic liberties. The Contract Clause, for example, applies
only against the states and protects only against the impairment of
existing contracts rather than fully embracing freedom of contract.1
Of course, the Constitution was once interpreted to be much more of a
charter of economic liberty. The so-called Lochner Court, through a
variety of doctrines, powerfully protected economic liberty. But many,
although not all, of these protections are difficult to derive from the
original meaning.
The Lochner Court’s protections of economic liberties have now been
largely eliminated. And most originalists—both on the Court and in the
academy—have generally accepted these changes as justified by the
original meaning.2 Yet, these originalists insist on enforcing those
economic protections that they believe are in accordance with the
Constitution’s original meaning. One protection that they have sought to
enforce is the Takings Clause.3
The Takings Clause protections have been extended not only to
physical takings, in which the government physically seizes or possesses
private property, but also to regulatory takings, in which the government
restrains the property holder from using his property as he desires.4
These protections against regulatory takings, however, have been
criticized on originalist grounds. Several commentators have attacked
judicial originalists like Justices Scalia and Thomas, as well as academic
originalists like Richard Epstein, on the ground that they support
covering regulatory takings, because the critics argue that the original
meaning of the Takings Clause does not extend to such takings.5
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that the Contract Clause applies only
to the states); Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return
to the Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (1987) (noting that
the Contract Clause only applies to existing contracts).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 159–60, 351–52 (1990). However, a significant minority of
originalists do continue to defend these economic liberties on originalist grounds. See,
e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 253–54 (2004).
3. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027 (1992) (majority
opinion by Justice Scalia).
4. Id.
5. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) [hereinafter Hart, Colonial Land Use
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As a friend of both economic liberty and originalism, it saddens me to
acknowledge that the critics have, so far, had the better argument. They
have strongly argued that the legal regime at the time of the Constitution
allowed regulatory takings, that there was little or no criticism of this
aspect of the legal regime, and that there was no case law applying state
takings clauses to regulatory takings.6 Thus, I unhappily conclude that
on the available evidence, the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment
does not cover regulatory takings.
But perhaps the story need not be entirely unhappy. While the federal
government is restricted by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the states are restricted by the Takings Clause as it is incorporated under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it is regularly, if not uniformly,
assumed that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause has the same original
meaning as the incorporated Fourteenth Amendment Takings Clause,
that may not be true. These enactments were passed at different times,
under different circumstances, and with different purposes. It turns out
that a potentially strong case can be made that the Takings Clause had a
different meaning under the Fourteenth Amendment, and in particular,
that it restricts at least some regulatory takings, even though the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause may not.
This essay develops the argument that the Takings Clause has a dual
original meaning. First, I review the original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause, concluding that the weight of the evidence
supports restrictions of only physical takings. Along the way, I critically
discuss the contrary argument of Richard Epstein in Takings7 as well as
the supportive argument by William Treanor, presented at the Conference.8
Second, I argue that the incorporated Takings Clause may have a broader
meaning than the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Applying Akhil
Amar’s view of the Bill of Rights and its incorporation, I sketch the
argument that the incorporated Takings Clause applies to nonphysical

Law]; John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of
the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1099–1100 (2000) [hereinafter Hart, Land
Use Law in the Early Republic]; William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782–84 (1995).
6. See infra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
7. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN ix, 230–31 (1985).
8. William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008).
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takings.9 While I do not seek to prove this argument—doing so would
require a significant amount of historical work and an acceptance of
Amar’s theory—my argument shows that a very plausible case can be
made for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment Takings Clause
covers some regulatory takings. Thus, opponents of the regulatory takings
doctrine cannot simply dismiss it as inconsistent with the original meaning.
This understanding of the incorporated Takings Clause fits well with
the overall structure of the Constitution’s protection of economic liberties.
Just as the Constitution protects only pockets of economic liberties, it
also protects against only some regulatory takings. Federal regulations
are left to a republican political process that was designed to provide
significant, but not categorical, protections for property rights.
While the Constitution may only protect against state regulatory
takings, the contemporary effects of this interpretation may be greater
than this half-a-loaf characterization might suggest. The great bulk of
the important regulatory takings cases, including Lucas and TahoeSierra Preservation Council, have involved state action rather than
federal action.10 If the original meaning of the incorporated Takings
Clause restricts regulatory takings, that has far-reaching implications for
current cases.
II. TAKINGS: PHYSICAL, REGULATORY, AND CONSEQUENTIAL
The Takings Clause states “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”11 One perennial question under
the Clause is what type of government action may constitute a taking.
One type of taking is a physical taking. Under this type, the government
physically seizes property either by claiming title to the property or
permanently occupying a portion of the property. This type of taking
has generally been covered by the Takings Clause from the beginning of
the Republic, and virtually all commentators believe the Clause applies
to such takings.12
By contrast, another type of taking is a regulatory taking. With this
type, the government does not take either title or possession of the
property, but instead regulates the owner’s use of the property. The
9. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 77,
80 (1998).
10. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 309, 311–12 (2002); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07, 1009
(1992).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 5, at 1101; Treanor, The
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, supra note 5, at
792–803.
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most famous recent example of a regulatory taking is the Lucas case, in
which South Carolina’s prohibition on the development of beachfront
property caused the property, according to the Supreme Court, to have
zero value.13
Similar yet distinct from regulatory takings are consequential takings.
These takings involve government action that does not actually possess
the owner’s property, but prevents him from enjoying the use of his
property. For example, the government may build a road or a wharf that
does not directly touch the owner’s property, but restricts access to it.
Consequential takings differ from regulatory takings because they do not
involve the regulatory power of the government, but instead involve
government improvements, such as building roads or improving
waterways.14
Although consequential takings are distinct from regulatory takings,
both are important because the usual arguments for excluding regulatory
takings from the Takings Clause also suggest that consequential takings
should be excluded. Like regulatory takings, consequential takings do
not physically take the title or possession of property, but merely prevent
the owner from using or otherwise enjoying the full benefits of his
property. Those who restrict the Takings Clause to physical takings
claim that early law covered neither regulatory nor consequential
takings.15 Thus, evidence that the Takings Clause covered consequential
takings is direct evidence that it was not limited to physical takings. It is
also indirect evidence that the Takings Clause would have been
understood to cover regulatory takings, because there is no obvious
reason why one would restrain consequential takings but not regulatory
takings.16
Of course, if regulatory and consequential takings are covered by the
Takings Clause, that still leaves the bigger question of how much protection
property owners should receive from regulatory and consequential
government actions. Under current law, the Supreme Court has applied
a lenient and vague test for regulatory takings.17 Fortunately, that

13. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07.
14. Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record
Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1224–26.
15. Treanor, supra note 5, at 796–97.
16. Kobach, supra note 14, at 1225, 1226 n.86.
17. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25, 127–28, 135
(1978).
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question is largely beyond the scope of this essay, which focuses on
whether regulatory and consequential takings are covered rather than the
degree of protection they should receive.
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
TAKINGS CLAUSE
A significant dispute in the scholarly literature exists on whether the
original meaning of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause restricts
regulatory takings. Textually, the question of whether regulatory or
consequential takings are covered turns largely on the meaning given to
two words in the Takings Clause: “property” and “take.”
In this Part, I examine in succession the case for and against covering
nonphysical takings under the Takings Clause. I argue that the language
of the Clause is ambiguous, but that evidence from the legal regime at
the time of the Constitution suggests that the Clause only covers
physical takings. I then examine and criticize the works of Richard
Epstein and William Treanor, two prominent commentators on the
Clause who have contrary views of it.
A. The Case for Coverage of Regulatory and Consequential Takings
At first glance, there appears to be a strong case for concluding that
the Takings Clause covers regulatory and consequential takings. One
can reasonably interpret the key words of the Clause so that they cover
such takings. Thus, the term “property” might be understood to mean
the various rights to property that an owner possesses, including not
merely the right to exclude, but also the right to use and enjoy his
property. This interpretation is supported by the discussion of property
in Blackstone’s Commentaries, which was widely read in the early years
of the nation.18 Blackstone writes that the individual right to property
“consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all of his
acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of
the land.”19 The term “take” might also support nonphysical takings if it
is understood in the ordinary senses of either depriving one of something
or as simply taking a nonphysical thing from someone.20 Thus, when the
government regulates or takes actions that affect someone’s right to use

18. Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 456 (2006).
19. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134
(photo. reprint, Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765).
20. See Treanor, Take-ings, supra note 8.
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and enjoy their land without physically seizing their property, it might be
deemed to take those property rights.
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that regulatory and
consequential takings often appear to require compensation just as much
as physical takings do. If a physical seizure of a part or the entirety of
one’s property for a public purpose is compensable, then it is not clear
why a regulation or consequential effect of government action for a
public purpose—especially if it imposes significant harm—should not
also require compensation.
B. The Case for Coverage of Only Physical Takings
Despite the apparent power of the case for covering regulatory and
consequential takings, the available evidence supports the view that the
original meaning of the Takings Clause extends only to physical takings.
The main problems for the broader interpretation of the Takings Clause
derive from the acceptance of regulation by the legal systems at the time
of the Constitution.
While the language of the Takings Clause can be read broadly, it can
also be read narrowly. First, the term “private property” might refer not
to each of the sticks in the bundle, but instead to the overall bundle of
sticks, with a focus on the exclusive right of possession. For example,
William Treanor defines “property” as “physical control of material
possessions.”21 A citizen is deprived of property under this view only
when he loses the right to possess his property—that is, when the
government takes the title—and the rights normally associated with it—
or when the government occupies his property. His property is not taken
when the government merely interferes with his use of it.
Second, the term “take” might also have the narrow meaning of
physically seizing something.22 When the government appropriates land
for a road, it has physically seized the property. By contrast, a right,
such as the right to use property, cannot be physically seized because
there is nothing physical to hold. Thus, if “take” had this physical
meaning, takings would be restricted to physical takings.
The language of the Clause, then, is ambiguous. It might be understood
narrowly to cover only physical takings or more broadly to cover
regulatory and consequential takings. It is the historical practices and
21.
22.

Id. at 633.
Id. at 633–34.
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interpretations, however, that strongly suggest that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause should be understood narrowly.
First, the legal regime in both the colonies and the independent states
prior to the adoption of the Constitution involved a significant degree of
property regulation.23 Many of these regulations would have been ripe
for a regulatory takings doctrine. Moreover, it does not appear that these
property regulations were significantly criticized or thought undesirable
when the Constitution was enacted.24 This absence of criticism suggests
that the Takings Clause was not adopting new principles that were
inconsistent with the existing legal regime. Second, the original state
takings clauses were not applied to regulatory measures or consequential
takings, but only to appropriations of property.25 These interpretations
of the state takings clauses suggest that the Federal Takings Clause was
understood as extending only to physical takings, since the state and
federal clauses used similar language.
These two pieces of evidence provide strong and mutually reinforcing
support for the conclusion that the Takings Clause only applied to
physical takings. They suggest that the legal system allowed significant
regulation, that this regulation was not thought to be illegitimate, and
that the state takings clauses were consistent with the traditional legal
system. This provides powerful evidence that the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause did not cover regulatory or consequential takings.
One might question the force of this evidence on the ground that these
legal systems and takings clauses existed at the state level, which does
not necessarily indicate that the enactors of the Constitution approved of
such actions at the federal level.26 Because the federal government had
relatively little power or need to regulate property and was often thought
to be more dangerous than the state governments, the enactors might
have wanted to impose additional restraints on it. While this is certainly
possible, a mere possibility is not strong evidence.27 If the enactors of
the Takings Clause wanted to impose a broader limitation on the federal
government, it is unlikely that they would have used the same language

23. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law, supra note 5; Hart, Land Use Law in the Early
Republic, supra note 5, at 1107–31.
24. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra note 5, at 1131.
25. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, supra note 5, at 791 n.50.
26. John Hart provides some evidence that Congress did not view the Takings
Clause as covering regulatory takings. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic, supra
note 5, at 1139–47.
27. Of course, there are other possibilities as well. For example, the enactors might
have thought additional restraints were unnecessary because the federal government did
not have enumerated authority to pass many regulations of property.
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that imposed a narrower restriction at the state level.28 Moreover,
contemporary accounts do not support this possible inference. St. George
Tucker, a leading contemporary commentator who favored strong
restrictions on the federal government, suggested that the Clause was
intended to prevent military confiscations, not to cover regulatory
takings.29
C. Richard Epstein’s Defense of Coverage for Regulatory Takings
My claims about the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause conflict with the work of Richard Epstein, one of the
leading commentators on the Clause. Epstein argues that one should
rely on the original meaning of the terms and he seeks to find that
meaning in the standard writers at the time,30 such as Blackstone and
Locke.31 While Epstein is aware that contemporary practices do not
conform to his very broad understanding of the Takings Clause, he
concludes that reliance on a narrow understanding of the Takings Clause
is detrimental. Epstein argues that the Framers:
[M]ay have meant to endorse both the takings clause and wages and price
controls without knowing the implicit tension between them. If they cannot
have both, then their explicit choice takes precedence over their silent one.
Suppose the framers believed both A and X, when A entails not-X. If A is the
constitutional text, then X is not allowed.32

Unfortunately, I must disagree with this argument—unfortunately,
because I regard Richard Epstein’s work in Takings as some of the very
best modern political theory within the Lockean tradition, even placing it
above Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia.33 Epstein’s use of
28. That the federal government had relatively little power to regulate property
does not necessarily suggest the application of broader takings principles against the
federal government. This minimal power might also suggest applying narrow principles
on the ground that the absence of federal powers makes broader principles less
necessary.
29. 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES editor’s app. at 305–06 (St. George Tucker
ed., Philadelphia, Birch & Small 1803).
30. Epstein is rightly skeptical of the speeches that the drafters made because they
were influenced by strategic considerations. Epstein explains that “[w]here the number
of parties is large and the divergence of views great, the best evidence of textual
intention is the language of the text itself.” EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 26–27.
31. Epstein writes that the “founders shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s affection for
private property.” Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 28.
33. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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the very simple principle of forced and compensated exchanges within
Lockean theory to justify a whole set of legal practices that would
otherwise seem unjustified—practices from statutes of limitations to
eminent domain—is quite brilliant. But, as originalist constitutional
law, the argument is problematic.
While Epstein and I agree on following the original meaning, we
disagree about what that meaning is. I have been arguing that the language
of the Takings Clause is ambiguous, but that the physical takings
interpretation is strongly supported by contemporary legal practices, the
absence of criticism of these practices, and state judicial decisions.
Epstein seeks to avoid this result with two basic arguments. First,
Epstein relies on the “internal intellectual integrity of the [Takings
Clause],” which he regards as reflecting the Lockean world view.34 But
this reliance on the Lockean views of the Framers cannot bear the weight
he places upon it. First, it is too simple to ascribe a single theory to the
Framers. The real world at any time is a messier place. While they may
have praised Locke, the Framers’ generation also lived with various
property regulations that were inconsistent with Lockean thought. And
there is little evidence that they found those regulations to be problematic
and sought to eliminate them. Second, the Framers’ generation was also
influenced by republican political theories that were less protective of
property rights. Akhil Amar and William Treanor present evidence—
which I discuss below—that suggests the Framers held more republican
political views. One can argue about the relative influence of these
different views, but the diversity of political views indicates that one
need not follow a strict Lockeanism to give faith to the Framers’ actions.
Where the ordinary meaning of the words allows both a narrow and
broad interpretation, and where the existing legal landscape would be
significantly inconsistent with the broad interpretation, there is a strong
case for concluding that the narrow meaning was the original meaning
unless there is evidence that the enactors sought to change the legal
landscape.
Epstein’s argument about the inconsistency of the Takings Cause and
regulation does not require a different conclusion. If the language were
absolutely clear, then we might feel compelled to reject the regulatory
practices at the time of the framing. But the language of the Takings
Clause is ambiguous, and given that one of the meanings is consistent
with these regulatory practices, one would normally follow that meaning.
Interestingly, Epstein’s originalist approach in this area is similar in
some respects to the type of abstract originalism recently defended by

34.

738

EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 16, 26.

RAPPAPORT.FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 729, 2008]

10/14/2008 3:34:01 PM

Originalism and Regulatory Takings
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Jack Balkin. Balkin argues that clauses such as the Equal Protection
Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause have an abstract meaning,
such as prohibiting caste legislation.35 Balkin does not believe the enactors’
specific expectations about what constitutes caste legislation are part of
the original meaning of these Clauses.36 Instead, the abstract meanings
are to be given content over time as different social movements
influence the way each generation reads the Constitution.37
There are several possible criticisms of Balkin’s approach, but one is
that he is too quick to assume that the enactors’ expectations about the
Clauses they enacted were mistaken.38 If the enactors believed that laws
discriminating against women did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
and were not caste legislation, our first obligation is try to figure out
why. It is too politically convenient to assume that they were confused.
Rather, the most likely possibility is that they were using a particular
understanding of caste legislation. Perhaps, they did not believe
discriminations based on significant biological differences such as sex
constituted caste legislation. One must conclude that the enactors did
not place that meaning into the Constitution before concluding that their
expectations were mistaken.
Arguably, Epstein makes a mistake similar to Balkin’s. Before concluding
that the Framers were confused about the effects of the Takings Clause,
one must conclude that they did not have a different understanding of the
language they used in the Clause. I am sympathetic to the political
principles that motivate Epstein’s and Balkin’s arguments—I wish the
Takings Clause covered regulatory takings and the Fourteenth Amendment
protected women—but one needs to distinguish political principles from
legal interpretation.
While the evidence does seem to me to weigh against covering
regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, this conclusion is not
certain. One way to argue against it is to show that the regulatory
practices that existed at the time of the framing can be explained with a
principle that would nonetheless prohibit certain regulatory takings. Eric

35. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 101,
298–99 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=925558.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretative
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=962142.

739

RAPPAPORT.FINAL.DOC

10/14/2008 3:34:01 PM

Claeys’s work attempts to show that traditional regulations were often
consistent with a background theory that protects property rights from
some regulatory takings.39 If Claeys’s efforts could be sustained, then
there might be no real conflict between a broader reading of the Takings
Clause and these regulatory practices. But on the existing evidence, the
case for the narrower interpretation of the Takings Clause seems
stronger to me.
D. William Treanor’s Argument about the Meaning of “Take”
While Claeys’s argument might, with additional evidence, support
covering regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment, William Treanor
has written a new article for the conference that would, if his claims are
accepted, have the effect of precluding Claeys’s efforts. Treanor argues
that the meaning of the term “take” at the time of the Constitution
referred to “physical acts.”40 While not explicit about it, he seems to
suggest that regulatory takings are not covered because government
regulations do not physically take property. If a government regulation
restricts development, as in the Lucas case, it does not physically seize
anything from the property owner. Therefore, there would be no taking.41
Under this definition, it would not matter whether Claeys was able to
explain that most of the framing era regulations complied with a different
background theory. Even if they did, the original plain meaning of the
Takings Clause would preclude finding that the government had taken
property. Moreover, this definition of “take” would appear to deny
regulatory takings irrespective of the definition of property. While
Treanor himself holds that property means “physical control of material
possessions,”42 it would not matter if property was defined as Blackstone
defined it—in terms of usage rights—because regulations do not
physically take these usage rights. Thus, Treanor’s argument is potentially
important.
Treanor’s argument, however, is not persuasive. Treanor adopts the
strategy of first looking at the modern definition of “taking” and then
moving to the definition in 1789.43 Relying on a modern dictionary,
Treanor claims that the modern meaning of the word “take” always has a
39. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1549, 1549–66 (2003).
40. Treanor, Take-ings, supra note 8, at 634.
41. Treanor never defines the original meaning of “take” in his contribution to the
Symposium. Instead, he often describes it as being inconsistent with regulatory takings.
Id. at 634, 635, 637, 639. But, his basic point appears to be that “take” must refer to a
physical act by the government. Id.
42. Id. at 633.
43. Id. at 634, 637–38.
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physical component.44 He therefore concludes that if the Takings Clause
were written today, its meaning would not cover regulatory takings.45
But this argument is mistaken. Although it is not clear whether a
takings clause that was interpreted using the modern meaning of its
terms would cover regulatory takings, it is clear that the language by
itself would not decide the matter. With modern meanings, the language
of the Takings Clause is ambiguous. Treanor supports his claim that the
language is unambiguous with Webster’s Dictionary, which defines
“take” with meanings such as “[t]o get into one’s possession by force,
skill, or artifice” and “[t]o grasp with the hands.”46 But exclusive reliance
on dictionaries is a dangerous practice. Dictionaries are certainly a useful
starting point for determining word meanings, but all usages will not be
reflected in dictionaries. This is especially true of meanings which
involve questions of nuance, such as whether a taking needs to be
physical.
In fact, Treanor’s claims about the modern meaning of “take” are
mistaken because “take” can be used without any physical component.
For example, imagine that I am speaking with a colleague about an idea
I have for an article. Then, six months later, I discover that he has published
his own article developing my idea. It would be entirely natural for me
to complain, “I can’t believe that he took my idea.” There is no physical
component to this—an idea is nonphysical—but it is clearly acceptable
for me to use the word “take.”
Treanor also relies on an exchange with his daughter. He says that if
he tells his daughter “that she cannot play ball in the apartment,” she will
“not accuse me of having ‘taken’ her ball—or, for that matter, of having
‘taken’ anything at all.”47 Perhaps not, but that hardly shows that all
takings involve a physical aspect. I also have talks with my children.
Once, my younger son finished his homework and had fifteen minutes
left to play until his bedtime. I came into his room and proceeded to
discuss our weekend plans. When we were done, it was time for him to
go to bed, prompting him to complain: “Daddy, you took all my time.”
A taking need not involve a physical component.
Another example involving my other child provides further evidence.
My wife and I had punished our older son by forbidding him from
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 633–34.
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
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playing with his computer game for a week. He kept the computer disk
which held the game, but was forbidden to play it. Even though we did
not take the disk, he often refers to this punishment as the time when
“we took away his computer game.” Clearly, he believes that a rule
prohibiting him from using the game, but not physically taking it away
from him, takes the game from him. Sometimes, we use the term “take”
to mean something like deprive.
These examples show that dictionaries are not complete or fully
reliable indicators of usage, especially as to secondary questions such as
whether “take” requires a physical taking, which is not the question that
the dictionary is attempting to address. There is simply no substitute for
examining usage in documents and speech to accurately determine
meaning.
Treanor’s argument becomes even less convincing when he moves
from the modern meaning of “take” to its 1789 meaning. Again, his
strategy is to examine dictionaries. One dictionary that he considers is
Sheridan’s Dictionary from 1789, which lists a large number of meanings
for “take.”48 While Treanor claims that “none of the definitions provided in
these dictionaries is consistent with the idea that regulation of property
is a taking,” it is not clear why he thinks this is so.49 The Sheridan
Dictionary includes the following definitions of “takings”: to seize what
is not given, to receive, to receive with good or ill-will, to use, to
employ, to receive into the mind, and to copy.50 But not all of these
meanings suggest a physical component. For example, “to receive” and
“to use” do not necessarily indicate a physical component. One might
use an idea. Although some of these meanings might be explained away
as involving different contexts, it would seem that Treanor owes us some
discussion of the matter.
Of course, as I suggested above, it is not sufficient to examine
dictionaries to get the meanings of terms. One wants to determine how
the words are used. Some of the best originalist scholarship examines
word usage rather than simply relying on dictionary definitions.51 To
test Treanor’s claim, I reviewed the usage of the term “take” in The
Federalist Papers and uncovered a variety of examples that appear to
use the term without a physical component. For example, in Federalist
No. 19, James Madison, with the assistance of Alexander Hamilton,
wrote that the Franks, after “having conquered the Gauls, established the
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 638.
Id. At 637.
Id. at 638 (quoting THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 1789)).
51. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 849–51 (2003).
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kingdom which has taken its name from them.”52 Similarly, in Federalist
No. 24, Hamilton wrote that his own “statement of the matter is taken
from the printed collections of state constitutions.”53 In Federalist No.
42, Hamilton wrote, “[t]his is not the only case in which the articles of
confederation have [attempted] . . . to reconcile a partial sovereignty in
the Union, with compleat sovereignty in the States; to subvert a
mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole
remain.”54
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in Federalist No. 54, Madison
wrote “that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken
away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of
representation with the other inhabitants.”55 Significantly, this usage is
the one that the broader interpretation of the Takings Clause employs.
Hamilton’s language makes clear that the language at the time of the
Constitution allowed one to talk of taking away property rights. Thus, if
“property” meant “property rights,” including rights to use property,
then the Takings Clause might have employed the term “take” to mean
taking those usage rights. Clearly, because rights are not a physical
entity, the term “take” did not always have a physical component.
IV. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE
Concluding that the original meaning of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment does not cover regulatory takings has normally meant
the end of the analysis for commentators who are exploring originalist
takings principles. They then assume or assert that the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause also applies when the incorporated
Takings Clause is applied under the Fourteenth Amendment.56
But this claim is not necessarily warranted. The original meaning of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause may not be the same as the original
meaning of the Takings Clause incorporated under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Here, I argue that there is a strong case for the possibility
that the incorporated Takings Clause has a different meaning than the
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 19 (James Madison).
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton).
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54 (James Madison).
56. See Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, supra note 5, at 862.
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original Takings Clause—in particular, that the incorporated Clause
protects against some nonphysical takings even though the original
Clause does not.
A. Incorporation and the Divergence of Meaning
Before even discussing the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment
Takings Clause has a different meaning, it is necessary to address the
general question of incorporation to determine whether an incorporated
Takings Clause even exists. Although the Supreme Court has incorporated
most of the Bill of Rights for some time, and the Takings Clause for at
least a century, whether the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
allows for incorporation is a matter of significant controversy.57 There
are serious questions about incorporation under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,58 but, as I discuss below, a strong
originalist case has been made by Akhil Amar for incorporation under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
If the Bill of Rights has been incorporated, the next question is: what
is the content of the rights that are incorporated under the Fourteenth
Amendment? While the Supreme Court generally assumes that the rights
have the same meaning under the original Bill as under the Fourteenth
Amendment, that, of course, does not resolve the original meaning.
One possibility is that the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended the original meaning of the Bill of Rights to be applied under
the Fourteenth Amendment. But that is not the only possibility.
Another possibility is that the enactors intended a new and different
meaning. The rights that were protected under the Bill might have come
to be understood as having a different content. One would, of course,
need evidence that the new meaning existed and was adopted—evidence
of legal understandings and of reasons why the new content might have
seemed compelling—but with such evidence, one might conclude that
the incorporated Bill differed from the original one.
B. Akhil Amar’s Theory of Incorporation
While there are various ways that one might incorporate, the most
persuasive and developed case is presented by Akhil Amar in The Bill of

57. The incorporation of the Takings Clause is usually thought to have occurred in
Chicago. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–41 (1897). See,
e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1082 n.24 (1993).
58. Most significantly, the term “due process” is not one that would naturally
suggest protection of the substantive as well as the procedural aspects of the Bill of
Rights.
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Rights, which is one of the best books on constitutional law that I have
read.59 Its learning, originality, elegance, and persuasiveness make it a
work of excellence. It thus makes sense to use Amar’s theory of
incorporation to explore the incorporation of the Takings Clause, even if
one is, like me, not certain of all of Amar’s claims or even of many basic
issues concerning the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 60
Amar’s theory sees the original Bill of Rights as having different
content and different purposes than our modern view of the Bill. Amar
argues that the original Bill of Rights was more about majority rights
and federalism than our modern understanding of it as a charter of
individual freedoms against the tyranny of the majority.61 This focus on
the majoritarianism and federalism of the Bill of Rights makes sense
when one realizes that the original Bill largely reflected the concerns of
the Antifederalists, who criticized the new Constitution for being too
nationalist and too elitist—for creating too great a risk that the distant
national government would use its authority to oppress the people.62
The Antifederalists believed that the Republic would be safer if the
states and ordinary people had more power. Thus, it is no surprise that
the Bill of Rights, which was taken from Antifederalist proposals,
attempted to protect federalism and majoritarianism.63
Two examples illustrate the argument.64 While today the Establishment
Clause is thought of as opposing the establishment of religion, the
original Establishment Clause was more of a federalism provision which
forbade Congress from either establishing a national religion or
disestablishing an established state religion.65 Amar also argues that the
Second Amendment had at its core the right of the people to bear arms
59. AMAR, supra note 9.
60. Despite my praise of the book, I do not mean to suggest that I accept
everything in it or even that I have concluded that the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights. The original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment is one of the most difficult issues in constitutional law, and I have not
reached firm conclusions about many aspects of it. But incorporation is accepted by
many scholars and Amar’s theory is powerful enough to justify exploring what the
meaning of the incorporated Takings Clause would be under his theory.
61. AMAR, supra note 9, at xii.
62. Id. at 9–11, 126–27.
63. Id. at 78.
64. I select these two examples because they are relatively easy to explain and
therefore somewhat obvious. The power of Amar’s approach, however, is that it persuasively
accounts for so many plausible changes in the meaning of the Bill, not just the more
obvious ones.
65. AMAR, supra note 9, at 32–42.
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as part of the militia.66 Again, this right concentrated on protecting the
militias as the safest military organization for a free people, and also as a
means of resisting federal usurpations of powers.67 The power here was
focused on the people as a whole rather than as individuals.68
While the meaning and character of the original Bill of Rights may
have had a majoritarian and federalist orientation, Amar argues that the
Bill of Rights incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment had a very
different meaning and character. For Amar, the original meaning of the
incorporated Bill of Rights had a more modern focus on protecting
individual rights from the majority.69 This new focus on individual rights,
rather than on the rights of states and majorities, made sense for two
basic reasons. First, because these rights were to be applied against the
states, it was inappropriate to view them in federalism terms or as rights
of the states. Second, the individualist orientation of these rights was
appropriate because the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect
freedmen and other minorities, such as southern unionists, who had been
and continued to be at risk from hostile southern majorities.70
Amar shows that this individualistic interpretation of the Bill of Rights
had developed prior to the Civil War. He roots the interpretation in a
tradition of thinking about the Bill of Rights, which he calls that of the
Barron Contrarians.71 These contrarians believed that the original Bill of
Rights applied against the states, contrary to Chief Justice Marshall’s
decision in Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore.72 Many
abolitionists adopted this view of the original Bill of Rights, which they
used to criticize the oppressive aspects of southern slave society.73
Amar suggests that many of the leaders of the Thirty-Ninth Congress

66. Id. at 46–49.
67. Id. at 46–59.
68. While Amar believes the core of the right involves the right of the people in
their militias, he should not be interpreted as claiming that it is somehow exclusively a
right of the states to have national guards. Amar notes that the Constitution distinguishes
between rights of the people, like that in the Second Amendment, and rights of the states.
Moreover, the militia in 1789 was generally understood as referring to all citizens capable of
bearing arms. Id. at 51. He even acknowledges that the language of the Amendment is
broad enough to protect individual rights, but he argues that the focus was on the militia,
not on hunting. As Amar states, “to see the [original Second] [A]mendment as primarily
concerned with an individual right to hunt or to protect one’s home is like viewing the
heart of the speech and assembly clauses as the right of persons to meet to play bridge or
to have sex.” Id. at 49.
69. Id. at xiv–xv.
70. Id. at xiv, 242.
71. Id. at 145–56.
72. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 250–51 (1833).
73. AMAR, supra note 9, at 160–62.
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who had written the Fourteenth Amendment, including John Bingham, were
followers of this tradition.74
Amar argues that these groups placed their individualistic ideas about
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, they
used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to apply the Bill of Rights
against the states, but did so in a way that reflected their understanding
of the Bill as an instrument that protected individuals from oppressive
majorities.75
Amar allows us to see how this objective was realized in the
constitutional text. He explains that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects against state abridgment of at least the rights that citizens enjoy
as citizens of the United States—rights which include those announced
in the Bill of Rights. But he argues that the term “privileges or
immunities of citizens” had a subtle but key transformative effect: the
term referred to the rights of individual citizens rather than to the rights
of states or majorities.76 Thus, the language of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in essence says that individual rights of United States citizens
shall not be abridged by the states. This interpretation takes the individual
rights component and understanding of the original Bill of Rights and
applies it to the states. One strength of Amar’s theory is that it explains
in a plausible way how the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
could have accomplished this result.
Our two aforementioned examples from the original Bill of Rights
illustrate how incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
can change the meaning of the Bill. While the Establishment Clause
was principally a federalism provision under the original Bill, there is
some evidence that it came to have a new meaning over time. For example,
some states (and federal territories) adopted establishment clauses in
their constitutions and some state judicial decisions suggested that the
Federal Establishment Clause applied against their states.77 Since these
clauses and decisions cannot be understood as motivated by federalism,

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 147.
Id. at 163–71.
Id. at 163–71, 221–23.
Id. at 249–51.
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they might be seen as protecting an individual right of people not to be
subject to an established church.78
Similarly, the Second Amendment, according to Amar, went from
being a right that was focused on the ideal of the militia for a free people
to the right of individuals to use guns for self defense and hunting.
Discussions of the right to bear arms both before the Civil War and
before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment suggest that people
understood the right—through their language and their assertions—
differently than the original Founders did.79 The right was not principally a
means of resisting the national government and its army—after all, the
Union Army was seen as a force for good by the enactors of the
Fourteenth Amendment—but as a right of individuals, especially
freedmen and other minorities, who needed it to defend and provide for
themselves.80 As Amar explains, “between 1775 and 1866 the poster
boy of arms morphed from the Concord minuteman to the Carolina
freedman.”81
Thus, the incorporated Bill of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
may have had a different meaning than the original Bill of Rights. If the
rights in the original Bill had developed a new meaning in the years
leading up to Reconstruction, and if the enactors of the Amendment had
used those new meanings, the incorporated Bill would have a different
meaning than the original Bill.82
C. Applying the Theory to the Takings Clause
Our concern, though, is with the Takings Clause. Interestingly, Amar
reads the original Takings Clause as something of an exception to the
remainder of the Bill of Rights. While much of the Bill of Rights
78. Amar is not certain that the Establishment Clause actually applies against the
states. Instead, he is also open to the view that the Free Exercise Clause protects against
many aspects of state established religions. Id. at 245–57.
79. Id. at 259–66.
80. Id. at 257–67.
81. Id. at 266.
82. There is a significant degree of resistance among some scholars to admitting
that the incorporated Bill might have a different meaning than the original Bill. Yet, it
seems clear that two similarly worded provisions enacted at different times and in
different contexts might have different meanings. To take an especially clear case,
imagine that the Due Process Clause had been originally enacted not under the Fifth
Amendment, but under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment was entirely procedural. Now assume that a constitutional
amendment was enacted in 1925, at the height of the substantive due process era that
applied due process to the federal government, and that part of the reasons given for
passing the amendment was that it was necessary to protect certain substantive rights. It
seems clear that the 1925 Due Process Clause might have a substantive meaning, even
though the original meaning under the Fourteenth Amendment was entirely procedural.
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reflected majoritarian values, Amar believes that the Takings Clause did
not.83 Instead, he views it as having been included by James Madison to
reflect his individualistic views about property.84 Support for this view
derives in part from the fact that the Takings Clause is the only right in
the entire Bill that was not proposed by the states during ratification.85
Although the Takings Clause does not reflect majoritarianism, Amar
argues that the Clause reflects federalism values because it only applies
against the federal government.86
While Amar may be correct about the original Takings Clause, that
certainly does not end the matter. If the original Clause conferred an
individual right, then no change in the meaning would have been
necessary for the Clause to be understood as a privilege or immunity.
One need not transform it from a majority or state right to an individual
right. Still, that does not mean that the Clause had the same meaning in
1789 as it did in 1866. There is a strong case that the content of takings
principles evolved, and the Fourteenth Amendment enactors adopted the
Clause’s later meaning because it better served their principles and
purposes.
1. The Original Takings Clause
The original Takings Clause may have been an individual rights
provision, but it was still part of a Bill that reflected the traditional
republican concerns expressed by the Antifederalists.87 To put the point
differently, Madison may have written the first draft of the Clause, but it
was amended in Congress and then ratified by the states, that were, by
hypothesis, animated by Antifederalist concerns. This Antifederalist
republicanism may have influenced the nature of the right.
The individual right to be compensated for having one’s property
taken may have been defined narrowly or broadly—it might have
extended only to physical takings or also to regulatory and consequential
83. AMAR, supra note 9, at 77–80.
84. Amar views the inclusion of the Takings Clause as clever bundling, but I find
his argument unpersuasive. Id. at 78. Even if Madison bundled it with other clauses,
either the House or Congress could still have deleted it. A more plausible explanation is
that the Takings Clause was accepted, even though it did not have a majoritarian
orientation, because it was relatively narrow. It is not necessary for the entire Bill to be
majoritarian for Amar’s general points to stand.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 79.
87. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
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takings. Under Amar’s theory, it would not be surprising that the
original Takings Clause would have conferred the narrower right because
Amar contends that the concerns which animated the Bill of Rights were
not those of individuals, but instead of majorities and states.88 Thus,
although an individual right could slip into the Bill, it makes sense that
such a right was narrow.
Treanor’s account of the Clause is also helpful. Treanor argues that
republicanism was very influential at the time of the Constitution.89
While his understanding of the forces at work in 1789 differs somewhat
from Amar’s, Treanor’s basic point is compatible with Amar’s so far as
it extends to the Takings Clause. For Treanor, the Bill of Rights enactors’
inclusion of the Takings Clause reflected a specific concern: the enactors
generally respected majoritarian values, but they were concerned that the
majoritarian process might not operate well in the limited circumstances
raised by physical takings of particular property.90 Thus, they would
have had strong reasons to protect only against physical takings and
otherwise rely on majority decisionmaking.
Amar’s and Treanor’s views support a consistent account of a narrow
Takings Clause. Under this account, the Takings Clause did not protect
against regulatory and consequential takings because the Founders were
largely majoritarian and believed that this right ought to be categorically
protected only in limited circumstances.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
Although this analysis suggests that the Fifth Amendment protects
only against physical takings, the story changes when we examine the
Fourteenth Amendment. The argument for expanding the Takings Clause
to cover nonphysical takings is supported by two mutually reinforcing
arguments. First, the structure and purposes of the incorporated Bill of
Rights favor an expanded Takings Clause. Second, the legal landscape
concerning takings that preceded the Fourteenth Amendment’s
adoption also supports an expanded Takings Clause.
a. Structure and Purposes
Amar’s analysis of the incorporated Bill of Rights provides various
reasons why the Fourteenth Amendment Takings Clause would extend
beyond physical takings. First, Amar’s argument that the Fourteenth
88. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
89. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, supra note 5, at 819–25.
90. Id. at 836–55.
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Amendment was intended to protect individual rights against abuses by
the majority—rather than to protect majorities and federalism—provides
strong general support for an expanded Takings Clause. We have seen
how the desire of Antifederalists and republicans to protect majority
decisionmaking in 1789 helps explain why the Clause might have been
applied only to physical takings.91 By contrast, the desire of the Fourteenth
Amendment enactors to protect individual rights suggests that they
would not have been quick to pass a takings clause that would leave the
individual rights of former slaves or other vulnerable minorities at risk.
While the original Bill of Rights may have reflected republican ideas,
the incorporated Bill reflected liberal principles that were congenial to
broad rights protections.92
Second, these broader protections would have been needed during
Reconstruction. State governments controlled by those sympathetic to the
former Confederacy had shown themselves willing, through the passage
of the Black Codes and other actions, to use government power to harm
the freedmen and others opposed to the Confederacy.93 Applying the
Takings Clause to the states would have been necessary to protect these
unpopular groups from having their property seized without compensation.
But applying the Takings Clause only to physical appropriations might
have been inadequate. That would still have allowed state governments
to impose uncompensated consequential or regulatory takings on these
disfavored groups, either to punish them or to transfer onto them the
costs of needed projects.94

91.
92.
93.

See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 42–43 (1988).
94. It might be objected that an equality principle under the Equal Protection
Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause would prohibit regulations or other
government actions designed to harm African Americans, and therefore a broader
takings clause would not have been necessary. This objection, however, is mistaken
for two reasons. First, even if African Americans were fully protected by Fourteenth
Amendment equality principles, it is very possible that other vulnerable groups, such as
unionists, would not be. Second, it might often be difficult to prove that a particular
regulation or other government action was motivated by the race of the people who were
harmed by it. It is also not clear that a regulation or government action that did not
expressly discriminate against blacks would have been found to violate the equality
principle. One might wonder whether the original meaning of the equality principle
forbade only express discrimination or also intentional discrimination not evident on the
face of a statute. But even if intentional discrimination that was not evident on the face
of a statute was prohibited, it is often not possible to establish discriminatory intentions.
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Moreover, this focus on broad property rights as necessary individual
rights would not have seemed anomalous to the enactors of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While liberals beginning in the twentieth century have
downplayed property rights as an element of freedom, that is not true of
the movement that led to the Fourteenth Amendment. The enactors of
the Fourteenth Amendment accepted the importance of basic common
law rights—including the rights of private property—to the freedom of
the individual. It was these rights that had been attacked by the Black
Codes, and it was these rights that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment were designed to protect.95
In fact, the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment raises the
possibility that the rights protected by the Takings Clause may even
have occupied a preferred position in some republican thinking. In its
journey through Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment went through
various permutations on its way to passage, many of them suggested by
John Bingham.96 When the Joint Committee was considering an amendment
that would have prohibited race discrimination as to civil rights, Bingham
sought to add to it, “nor shall any state deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for
public use without just compensation.”97 Clearly, the protection of private
property from takings was an essential right for Bingham, one that he
thought required singling out. Bingham’s proposed addition was blocked 75, but subsequently Bingham successfully proposed a provision that
protected all privileges and immunities of United States citizens.98
Although there are various ways to read this legislative history, one
plausible view is that it reflected Congress’s belief that while the
Takings Clause was important, it was better to incorporate all of the Bill
of Rights.

A decision to build a road in a particular place or to pass a certain type of regulation
might be made for a variety of reasons. The enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood that southern majorities might use indirection to accomplish their goals
because the Amendment was passed, in part, to address attempts made through the Black
Codes to preserve the servitude of African Americans. Id. The enactors may therefore
have written the Amendment broadly to counteract such circumventions.
95. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS 1863–
1869, at 61–62 (1990) (noting that the Civil Rights Act protected basic rights under
Republican ideology). The Civil Rights Act protected former slaves against discrimination
regarding their rights “to make and enforce contracts . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property.” Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (1866).
96. See NELSON, supra note 93, at 48–58.
97. M ICHAEL K ENT C URTIS , N O S TATE S HALL A BRIDGE : T HE F OURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 84 (1986).
98. Id.
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Finally, the application to the states of the Takings Clause, which had
originally applied only against the federal government, might have led
the enactors to expand the right. The specific concern that seemed to
most motivate the passage of the Takings Clause was opposition to the
army’s impressment of property.99 This concern, which resonates with
the Antifederalist worries about a centralized army, could have been
addressed by prohibiting only physical seizures of property. By contrast,
the incorporated Takings Clause would apply to the states, which had a
long history of land regulation. Since the states could use this governmental
authority not only to seize property, but also to impose consequential
and regulatory harms, it would be natural to restrict those types of harms
when one was applying the Clause to the states.
b. The Legal Landscape of Takings
Thus, the structure and purpose of the incorporated Bill of Rights
provide reasons to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment would have
embraced a Takings Clause that extended beyond physical takings. But
unless there was also reason to believe that the concept of takings might
cover nonphysical harms, these arguments would probably be inadequate.
To put the point differently, if takings principles at the state level were
uniformly applied only to physical takings, then it would be hard to
believe that anyone would have understood the incorporated Takings
Clause as applying to nonphysical takings. By contrast, if some states
understood takings principles to cover consequential and regulatory
takings, then the enactors of the incorporated Takings Clause might have
adopted that understanding, especially because it would have furthered
the purposes and principles that motivated their passage of the incorporated
Bill of Rights.
While the legal regime in place prior to and immediately after the
adoption of the original Bill of Rights shows little evidence that
nonphysical takings were covered by the Clause, the legal regime in
place when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted differs markedly.
Notably, the desire and perceived need to protect against takings had
grown tremendously between the enactment of the original Bill and that
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While there were only a couple of
takings clauses in 1789, the landscape looked quite different in 1866, as

99.

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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the principle of requiring compensation for takings had become virtually
universal at the state level.100 Many state constitutions contained takings
clauses, including virtually all of the states that joined the union after the
founding.101 In the remaining states, the requirement of paying just
compensation was found in judicial decisions that relied on natural law
or common law.102 As Amar writes, “[d]octrinally, virtually all midnineteenth-century jurists deemed just compensation a fundamental
principle of justice.”103
Even more importantly, state decisions had recognized that takings
could occur not only from physical seizures, but from consequential and
regulatory actions as well. While Treanor and others have argued that
takings principles only covered physical takings until after the Civil War
or until Justice Holmes’s decision in Mahon, recent scholarship has
challenged this view.104 This new scholarship argues that the law prior
to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment grew to incorporate an
understanding of takings that extended beyond physical seizures of
property.105 This understanding included the protection of property
owners’ usage rights against a variety of government actions that infringed
on those rights.106 The new scholarship shows that many judges were
prepared to strike down government actions and regulations that affected
private property rights, even though the government did not physically
seize property.
This scholarship explores both consequential and regulatory takings.
Under both types of takings, the harms to the property owner do not
involve a seizure of his property or even an interference with his exclusive
right to possess it. Instead, consequential and regulatory takings involve
an interference with various rights of property owners to use their
property or not be forced to take costly actions. These cases fall into a
variety of categories that might be listed as takings for interferences with
the usage rights of riparian owners,107 interferences with nonriparian

100. AMAR, supra note 9, at 268–69; Kobach, supra note 14, at 1230, 1233.
101. Kobach, supra note 14, at 1230.
102. Id. at 1230–31.
103. AMAR, supra note 9, at 268–69.
104. See Kobach, supra note 14, at 1215 nn.25–27 (citing scholars); Treanor, supra
note 5, at 798–804.
105. Claeys, supra note 39, at 1549; Kobach, supra note 14, at 1212.
106. See infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
107. See Gardner v. Trs. of Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 162 (N.Y. Ch.
1816); People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819); Crenshaw & Crenshaw
v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 264–65, 270, 276 (1828); Cooper v. Williams,
5 Ohio 391, 393 (1832); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129, 129 (1839); Comm’rs v.
Kempshall, 26 Wend. 404, 404 (N.Y. 1841); Walker v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 16 Ohio 540,
540 (1847); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 53, 102–03 (1851).
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usage rights,108 denials of access to land,109 and harms from physical
takings that do not involve a loss of exclusive possession, but instead the
incurring of expenditures.110
This collection of consequential and regulatory takings cases supports
a view of takings that extends beyond physical takings.111 This view has
implications for the meaning of both “property” and “taking.”112 First,
these cases show an understanding of “property” that is not limited to
exclusive possessory interests. Rather, it includes the protection of a
variety of usage interests, such as access to land, the right to use water
adjacent to one’s property, and usage of one’s land. Second, these cases
also show an understanding of “taking” that is not limited to a physical
taking. Rather, these interferences often involve no touching of the
proprietor’s property, such as deprivation of access to land or preventing
the usage of riparian rights. These cases show that many states did not
understand takings to be solely physical takings. Instead, the takings
jurisprudence was understood as protecting the right to use property,
even if there was no physical interference or seizure.113
108. See Patterson v. Boston, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 159, 160 (1838); Parker v. Boston
& Maine R.R., 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 107, 108 (1849); Woodruff v. Neal, 28 Conn. 165,
165 (1859).
109. See Fletcher v. Auburn & Syracuse R.R. Co., 25 Wend. 462, 462 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1841); Transylvania Univ. v. Lexington, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 25, 27 (1842); Parker,
57 Mass. (3 Cush.) at 108.
110. See Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 489, 489 (1807); Commonwealth
v. Justices of Middlesex, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 388, 388 (1812); Perley v. Chandler, 6 Mass.
(6 Tyng) 454, 454–55 (1810); In re Rensselaer & Saratoga R.R. Co., 4 Paige Ch. 553,
553 (N.Y. Ch. 1834); In re Mount Washington Road Co., 35 N.H. 134, 134 (1857);
Brown v. Worcester, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 31, 32 (1859); Old Colony & Fall River R.R.
Co. v. County of Plymouth, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 155, 156 (1859).
111. Another line of cases that supported an understanding of takings principles
broader than simply the physical taking of physical property was the group of decisions
involving government conferred franchises. See, e.g., West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 507, 533–34 (1848); id. at 543 (Woodbury, J., concurring); Treanor, supra
note 5, at 792 n.56 (“[J]udges repeatedly concluded that the revocation of a franchise
gave rise to a compensable taking on the theory that the revocation was a seizure of
intangible property.”).
112. Although most of the cases discussed above apply state law, some of them do
rely, at least in part, on federal constitutional law in the form of the Contract Clause.
See, e.g., Platt, 17 Johns. at 216. This suggests that the trends in law which led to the
expansion of takings principles at the state level also worked their way into federal
constitutional law.
113. In addition to the state court cases, the United States Supreme Court also
followed a broader understanding of takings principles in two cases decided at the time
of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 176–79 (1871); Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504–
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It is true that there were a greater number of consequential takings
cases than regulatory takings cases.114 While this might mean that
consequential takings were more accepted, that is not necessarily the
case. First, it is quite possible that there were simply more actions taken
by the government—such as building roads—than there were regulations
that raised takings issues. Government in those days appears to have
regulated less than it does today. Moreover, regulatory actions that
conformed to certain requirements, such as restraining nuisances or
taking actions that enhanced the value of all property rights holders,
would not have raised taking issues.
In addition, there are strong reasons for concluding that courts that
struck down consequential takings would also have struck down regulatory
takings. Because these types of actions are quite similar, it is hard to see
why one would draw a distinction between them.115 In both cases, the
government is presumptively taking action to promote the public. It is,
of course, true that in the case of regulatory actions that restrained
nuisances or other harmful actions, even the strictest regulatory takings
doctrine would not find a taking. But, where the regulation did not
satisfy these requirements, it is hard to see why such regulatory action
would be less likely to be found a taking than would nonregulatory
government action that had the same effect. Although the regulation
might be deemed to promote the public interest, that would also be the
case with the government activity.
Overall, it is not clear how widespread this expanded view of takings
was. One way to answer this question is to determine whether the
expanded view, concerning both consequential and regulatory matters,
was the more common rule. But to make that determination, one would
have to look not only at the states where the expanded view prevailed,
but also at the remaining states to decide whether they had actually
adopted the contrary rule. One would also want to look at the reputations of
the judges and persuasiveness of their opinions, because all judges and
decisions are not equal. For example, the New York courts, which were
quite vigorous protectors of property rights, might be deemed to be more
influential.

07 (1870). Although the Supreme Court later narrowed its articulation of takings principles,
critics of regulatory takings should not take great comfort in this, because this narrowing
coincided with a narrowing of civil rights that has been thought to reflect resistance to
the principles established in the Reconstruction Amendments. See Kobach, supra note
14, at 1279. Thus, rather than seeing these two cases as a temporary blip that did not
reflect the original meaning, one might view their narrowing as part of an effort to resist
the new charter of liberty established by the Reconstruction Amendments.
114. Id. at 1264–65.
115. Id. at 1225–26 n.86.
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Of course, even if the broader takings rule was not the leading rule—
and this would hardly be surprising—that would by no means determine
the meaning of the incorporated Takings Clause. The question hinges on
the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause at the time of its
enactment, and it is quite possible that people would have understood the
Clause to adopt the minority state rule, because that rule better served
the purposes and principles of both the Clause and the incorporated Bill.
D. Possible Objections
While this case law suggests that the incorporated Takings Clause
might have extended to consequential and regulatory takings, one might
question whether this conclusion really holds. First, one might wonder
whether it is proper to rely so much on state law for the content of the
incorporated Takings Clause. After all, why look to state takings clauses
and decisions rather than determine the meaning at the federal level?
This is an important objection, but nonetheless one for which there are
responses. Amar’s theory regularly relies on state law because he argues
that the state laws influenced the views that led to the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is not hard to understand why Amar employs this
reasoning. First, state law often showed how the type of rights in the
Bill would be applied in a context without federalism considerations.
Moreover, much of the state law developed many years after the original
Bill when liberal ideas were more influential and therefore represented a
model for how a liberal Bill of Rights should apply. In addition, in the
nineteenth century, state and federal law were often deemed to be interactive,
with judges using state provisions to determine federal meanings, and
vice versa, as well as sometimes applying a kind of constitutional
common law that reflected both federal and state law.116 Thus, state law
would have a significant impact on takings principles, especially given
the absence of cases interpreting the Federal Takings Clause.117
Another possible question about these cases involves the sources of
law under which they were decided. While some of the cases were
decided under state takings clauses, others were decided under different
116. See, e.g., Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 176–77 (interpreting Wisconsin
takings clause as having the same meaning as the Federal Takings Clause).
117. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, supra note 5, at 794 (citing Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent
Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 329, 376 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971)).
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doctrines, including natural law and the Contract Clause.118 Given this
diversity of sources, one might wonder whether these cases would have
been thought of as takings cases that inform the meaning of a takings
clause. Although it is possible that these cases might have been deemed
irrelevant to takings principles, it seems unlikely. When a court decision
stated that government action under certain conditions operated as a
taking that required just compensation, that decision likely would have
been thought of as informing takings principles even if it was decided
under another clause or source of law.119 Moreover, the state cases often
discussed legal principles in a way that seems to transcend particular
sources of law. Thus, it seems likely that opinions which discussed
takings would have been deemed relevant to takings principles even if
decided under provisions other than takings clauses.
E. Implications and Conclusion
If the argument I have been developing is correct, then its implications
may be quite significant. While the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause might cover only physical takings, the original meaning
of the incorporated Takings Clause would extend beyond physical
takings to consequential and regulatory takings. Thus, one could accept
the bulk of the current critics’ historical and textual argument of
regulatory takings and still conclude that they are mistaken as to state
takings cases. And, most of the recent takings cases, including the
famous ones, are state takings cases.120
Although this argument’s implications may be significant, we should
not ignore the limitations of the argument or the work that remains to be
done. First, all I have done in this essay is to identify the path on
which someone could proceed and to suggest that it might be a
promising path. I have not taken the path myself. One would have to do
quite a bit more work to be entirely confident that the best reading of the
incorporated Takings Clause under Amar’s theory extends to consequential
and regulatory takings.
Second, the biggest issue that remains, however, is not whether the
incorporated Takings Clause extends to nonphysical takings, but the
content of the limits that the Clause imposes. Although I have happily
placed this issue to the side, leaving it to others to explore, that is where
the real work remains. Other scholars have made real headway in this
118. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text; see also supra note 112.
119. See People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195, 216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (deciding case
under the Contract Clause on the basis of whether the government action was an exercise
of the police power or an impermissible taking).
120. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
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area with a focus on the original Takings Clause.121 I believe that a
focus on the Fourteenth Amendment would allow even greater progress.
After doing this hard work, one might end up concluding that the
limits which the incorporated Takings Clause places on nonphysical
takings are either relatively narrow or relatively broad. Under the
narrow view, one might limit the content of the doctrine to the facts and
rulings of the existing cases that I have cited. These cases do not appear
to extend all that far, especially as to regulatory takings. In that event,
many of the famous state regulatory takings cases might not result in
takings under the narrow view.122 Yet, the incorporated Takings Clause
would still cover some regulatory takings and one could not simply
dismiss all regulatory takings as nonoriginalist.
Alternatively, one might end up concluding that the limits were broader
than the facts and rulings of these cases suggest. First, one might view
these cases not as exhaustive, but as merely suggestive of the new
takings principles that were emerging. These cases might suggest that
takings principles would have been extended to additional regulations
and that the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment—with their commitments
to the protection of individual rights including property rights—would
have understood the principles in this way. This reading would gain
support if there were not many cases that approved these types of
regulations and if those that did were older and therefore more likely to
be deemed bad law.
Second, one might emphasize differences in the takings doctrine of
different states. If some states adopted broader nonphysical takings
principles than others, one might end up concluding that the enactors of
the Fourteenth Amendment adopted the broader doctrine because it best
supported their principles and purposes. Again, one would want evidence
to support the view that the enactors adopted these broader principles.
However one ends up resolving the precise scope of the incorporated
Takings Clause, if one concludes that the Clause protects property rights
more broadly than the original Takings Clause, this will be a happy
result for the friend of originalism and economic liberties. The stark
charge of the critics of regulatory takings—that they are a modern
invention inconsistent with the original meaning of the Clause—can then
121. Claeys, supra note 39.
122. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 14, at 1291 (discussing differences between the
cases and the modern regulatory takings doctrine and noting that Lucas would not have
been decided the same way under the earlier cases).
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be rejected. And if one concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment
adopted the broader nonphysical takings principles, the result will be
happier still. Even under these optimistic circumstances, the Constitution
still will not provide general protection for economic liberties, but the
areas of economic liberties which it does protect will be considerably
larger.
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